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Approved For Release 2001/09/04 : CIA-RDP80-01826R001100010026-5
Security Information

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26-5
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JUL 21 1953

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT: Personnel Office

REFERENCE: Your EYES ONLY memorandum, same subject, dated
1 July 1953, and my reply, dated 8 July 1953.

1. The information requested in the second paragraph of your
EYES ONLY memorandum was not included in the reply dated 8 July 1953.


2. The following persons on the FI Staff have as either their
primary responsibility or secondary responsibility the handling of
personnel matters:

Primary Responsibility - Personnel

<u>Name</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Grade</u>	<u>Unit</u>
			FI/Personnel
			FI/Personnel
			FI/Personnel
			FI/Personnel
			RI
			RI


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Secondary Responsibility - Personnel

	Chief, FI
	SPS
	Plans
	Staff C
	Staff D
	RQM

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DOCUMENT NO. _____
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☐
☐ DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS *2011*
NEXT REVIEW DATE: _____
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE *29/06/81* REVIEWER: *018991*


Chief, Foreign Intelligence

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JUL 8 1953

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT: Personnel Office

REFERENCE: Your EYES ONLY memorandum, same subject, dated
1 July 1953

1. The service rendered to this office by the Personnel Division (Covert) might be described at the present time as generally satisfactory. We have noted a decided improvement in the service during the past year particularly in the activities of the Central Processing, Placement, and Employee Relations Branches.

2. This general observation notwithstanding, however, we do feel that deficiencies exist in the service in the following categories.

a. Organization of the Personnel Files. Individual personnel files are filled with extraneous material which has no bearing on employees' careers and are deficient in providing pertinent information in many cases.

b. Control of Personnel Files. Inadequate control often results in the temporary loss of files even within Personnel Division itself; but more important, the wide dissemination of employee files permitted by PDC mitigates against the maintenance of any semblance of confidentiality with respect to the files' contents.

c. Confusion at Lower Levels in PDC. Clerical personnel who handle the important function of entrance on duty are often unaware of changes in policy or procedure with the consequent result of misdirection of new employees.

d. Faulty Position Inventory. The inaccuracy of the records of this unit results in the inability of PDC to provide true statistics on the physical location of personnel, e.g., despite the fact that the [REDACTED] were transferred from the FE Division to NEA in October 1951 and PDC has been notified several times of this change, personnel assigned to

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these countries in the field are still carried by Position Inventory as part of FE.

e. Incomplete Notification System. Failure on the part of Personnel to notify releasing offices of the effective date of transfer of personnel causes confusion in the offices concerned with the transfer. Likewise an apparent lag in notifying Fiscal or Finance Division of such transfers causes the misdirection of pay checks.

3. It is recognized that some of the deficiencies listed above are not solely the fault of the Personnel Division in that inefficiency in the offices served often compounds Personnel's problems; but it is felt that if PDC exercised greater control in the responsibilities which are primarily within its jurisdiction, improvement could be effected.



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Chief, Foreign Intelligence

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